American University Law Review
Volume 69

Issue 2

Article 8

2019

Working 9 to 5? Equal Protection and States' Efforts to Impose
Work Requirements for Medicaid Eligibility
David Wasserstein
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the State and
Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wasserstein, David (2019) "Working 9 to 5? Equal Protection and States' Efforts to Impose Work
Requirements for Medicaid Eligibility," American University Law Review: Vol. 69 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol69/iss2/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law
Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Working 9 to 5? Equal Protection and States' Efforts to Impose Work
Requirements for Medicaid Eligibility

This comment is available in American University Law Review: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol69/
iss2/8

WORKING 9 TO 5? EQUAL PROTECTION
AND STATES’ EFFORTS TO IMPOSE WORK
REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAID
ELIGIBILITY
DAVID WASSERSTEIN*
Since the election of Donald Trump, states’ efforts to reform and ultimately
curtail the welfare state have flourished. Following the lead of the federal
government, many states are actively attempting to reshape the mechanisms by
which low-income Americans apply for and receive services. One such program
under threat is Medicaid, a jointly funded federal-state effort to provide access
to healthcare for needy individuals. Many states are trying to impose a monthly
work requirement for beneficiaries to remain eligible within the program. The
imposition of work requirements threatens to disenroll thousands of previously
eligible individuals across the country. While these efforts are currently tied up
in federal court, the implications for those in poverty and for the welfare state
writ large are momentous.
Using efforts to institute a work requirement for Medicaid, this Comment
argues that those experiencing poverty ought to be afforded greater protections
from the courts and deserve some level of heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By tracing the Court’s
jurisprudence around wealth as a protected class, this Comment finds an
opening by which the Court should extend protections to those experiencing
poverty. Specifically, within the context of Medicaid, this Comment argues that
requiring Medicaid enrollees to work to remain covered via section 1115 waivers
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Andrew Urueta and the Law Review staff for their tireless efforts in the publication
process. Finally, to my family for their love and support and for instilling in me the
importance of always rooting for the underdog.
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impermissibly discriminates based on economic status and violates the intent and
purpose of Medicaid. These requirements impermissibly discriminate based on
economic status because policies affecting those experiencing poverty demand
heightened scrutiny, or at least a “rational basis plus bite” analysis, and do not
further a legitimate government objective, thus making them unconstitutional.
Even if such work requirements withstand a Fourteenth Amendment challenge,
promoting better health outcomes, saving the state money, and encouraging selfsufficiency at the risk of disenrolling innumerable, otherwise qualified people,
contravenes the intent and purpose of Medicaid. Extending any variant of
Fourteenth Amendment protections to those in poverty presents profound
implications for the American welfare state and would fundamentally alter the
social safety net. This Comment argues that now more than ever is the time to do so.
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But there is another tradition that we share today. It calls upon us never to
be indifferent toward despair. It commands us never to turn away from
helplessness. It directs us never to ignore or to spurn those who suffer untended
in a land that is bursting with abundance.

—Lyndon B. Johnson1
INTRODUCTION
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 furthered a longstanding
yearning amongst Republicans to institute generational welfare reform.
The Trump administration is in the process of reshaping the fundamental
mechanisms by which the government provides life-saving assistance.2
One such program under siege is Medicaid, a jointly funded federal-state
effort to expand access to healthcare for low-income Americans, that has
never required employment for beneficiaries to retain eligibility. Under
section 1115 of the Social Security Act,3 states can request “Demonstration
Waivers” to use federal Medicaid funds to implement “experimental,
pilot, or demonstration projects” in coverage approaches.4 The Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) has discretion to approve
waivers if the program or proposal furthers the objectives of Medicaid.5
In January 2018, in response to a growing number of states requesting
waivers to impose work requirements for Medicaid recipients, the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) sent a letter to
state Medicaid directors providing guidance as to the parameters for

1. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks with President Truman at the Signing
in Independence of the Medicare Bill (July 30, 1965) (transcript available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/241296 [https://perma.cc/LVM3-LZTAW]).
2. Juliet Linderman, Food Stamps: Trump Administration Moves to Tighten SNAP Work
Requirements, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ ctbiz-food-stamps-snap-work-requirements-20181220-story.html [https://perma.cc/59858RAJ]; Andrew Restuccia et al., Behind Trump’s Plan to Target the Federal Safety Net, POLITICO
(Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/11/trump-welfare-reformsafety-net-288623 [https://perma.cc/WBM3-K8BB].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012).
4. About Section 1115 Demonstrations, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1115-demo/about-1115/index.html
[https://perma.cc/U8MR-3QAR].
5. Id. CMS operates under a six-pronged framework to determine whether the
state’s proposal is within the fundamental objectives of Medicaid. For example, CMS
will approve a section 1115 waiver if the proposed program is designed to “promote
efficiencies that ensure Medicaid’s sustainability over the long term.” Id.
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what would pass muster.6 As of November 2019, eighteen states have
requested a section 1115 waiver with six gaining final approval by HHS.7
The position of CMS and HHS represents a notable shift in federal
policy. In the past, states’ requests to impose a work requirement on
Medicaid recipients were rejected by CMS and HHS.8
With the Trump administration’s more favorable attitude toward
waivers, Kentucky decided to impose a work requirement on its
Medicaid recipients. The State of Kentucky’s decision to impose work
requirements upended what had been an undeniably successful

6. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. Medicare & Medicaid Servs., SMD:
18-002, Letter to State Medicaid Directors RE: Opportunities to Promote Work and
Community Engagement Among Medicaid Beneficiaries (Jan. 11, 2018) [hereinafter
State Medicaid Directors Letter], https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance
/downloads/smd18002.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7N5-T2E5].
7. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-approved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state
[https://perma.cc/HR7T-9CLQ]. Of the states that have requested waivers, most
follow similar guidelines that require approximately eighty hours of employment or
volunteering and include exceptions for certain groups of people like those who are
pregnant or disabled. Id.; see also Hannah Katch et al., Taking Medicaid Coverage Away
from People Not Meeting Work Requirements Will Reduce Low-Income Families’ Access to Care
and Worsen Health Outcomes, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/taking-medicaid-coverage-away-from-people-notmeeting-work-requirements-will-reduce [https://perma.cc/XMB6-KSBT] (explaining
that CMS guidance allows states to apply work requirements to nearly all non-elderly adult
Medicaid enrollees thereby subjecting them to burdensome administrative
requirements). Legislators are grappling with the will of their electorates in deciding
whether to impose work requirements. See, e.g., Joe Lawlor, Maine Gov. Mills Rejects Work
Requirements LePage Sought for Medicaid, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://www.pressherald.com/2019/01/22/mills-rejects-work-requirements-lepagesought-for-medicaid-beneficiaries (explaining the new Democratic governor’s
decision to reject the previous administration’s imposition of work requirements).
8. See Nicole Huberfeld, Can Work Be Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 788, 788–91 (2018) (highlighting how Medicaid, unlike welfare, has never
emphasized work). The attachment of work requirements to welfare programs reflects
a long-standing desire of the political right to fuse personal responsibility and
entitlements, as seen in the welfare reform of the 1990s. See Vann R. Newkirk II, The
Trouble with Medicaid Work Requirements, ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/why-work-requirements-in-medicaidwont-work/520593 [https://perma.cc/MQC6-GWY4]; see also Allyson Baughman, A
History of Work Requirements, PUB. HEALTH POST (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.publichealthpost.org/viewpoints/history-of-work-requirements
[https://perma.cc/U3GQ-UPFU] (tracing the history of work requirements to the
Reagan administration).
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Medicaid expansion within the state in 2014.9 The State’s particular
waiver mandates that all Kentucky HEALTH (the name of the State’s
Medicaid program) enrollees without exemptions participate in eighty
hours of employment or community engagement activities and provide
documentation as a condition of continued eligibility.10 These
requirements have remained unchanged since Kentucky first requested
a section 1115 waiver in 2017.11
Kentucky residents immediately challenged the State’s waiver
request in federal district court.12 In the resulting litigation, Stewart v.
9. In January 2014, Kentucky chose to expand its Medicaid program to include
the newly authorized ACA-covered population group (133% of the Federal Poverty
Line), leading to over 375,000 residents enrolling in the state program and a number
of positive public health outcomes. See DELOITTE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY:
MEDICAID EXPANSION REPORT 2014 at 10, 46, 52, 68 tbl.32 (2015), https://jointhe
healthjourney.com/images/uploads/channel-files/Kentucky_Medicaid_Expansion
_One-Year_Study_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6W8-B4F5] (finding that in the
first year alone, 232,000 enrollees had a non-annual office visit, 160,000 received
medication monitoring, over 89,000 had their cholesterol checked, over 80,000
received preventative dental services, and 13,000 sought treatment for a substance
abuse disorder); see also Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Changes in Utilization and Health
Among Low-Income Adults After Medicaid Expansion or Expanded Private Insurance, 176
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1501, 1505–06 (2016) (detailing increased use of preventative
services, greater access to medications, reduced out-of-pocket healthcare expenses,
and improved self-reported health metrics).
10. Amy Goldstein, Trump Administration Again Permits Kentucky to Impose Work
Requirement for Medicaid Recipients, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trump-administration-again-permitskentucky-to-impose-work-requirement-for-medicaid/2018/11/20/04a097c0-ed2b11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.
11. Id.
12. ANUJ GANGOPADHYAYA & GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY, URBAN INST., UPDATED: WHO
COULD BE AFFECTED BY KENTUCKY’S MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENTS, AND WHAT DO WE
KNOW
ABOUT
THEM?
1
(2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/96576/3.26-ky-updates_finalized_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N8VG57F]; Amy Goldstein, New Lawsuit Challenges Trump Administration’s Support for
Medicaid Work Requirements, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/new-lawsuit-challenges-trumpadministrations-support-for-medicaid-work-requirements/2018/08/14/dde884629ff0-11e8-8e87-c869fe70a721_story.html?utm_term=.55e067372ea9.
Work
requirements in Arkansas were initially implemented before a judge could rule on
their propriety, thereby causing immediate harm to beneficiaries who no longer had
access to healthcare. See Amy Goldstein, A Job-Scarce Town Struggles with Arkansas’s First-inNation Medicaid Work Rules, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Goldstein, Job-Scarce
Town Struggles], https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/a-job-scarcetown-struggles-with-arkansass-first-in-nation-medicaid-work-rules/2019/03/26/f551c3525012-11e9-8d28-f5149e5a2fda_story. (highlighting the confusion amongst many former
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Azar,13 Judge James E. Boasberg of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia remanded waiver back to HHS for review, holding that the
Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because the agency had
not adequately accounted for substantial disenrollment in the
program.14 The court also expressed significant unease with the idea
that work requirements adhered to the intent and purpose of
Medicaid.15 After the remand and a mandated public comment period,
on November 20, 2018, CMS reapproved Kentucky’s work requirements
after the state made only minor technical adjustments.16 CMS again
asserted that the program fell within the objectives of Medicaid, but
plaintiffs subsequently challenged the revised work requirement in
court.17 While efforts in Kentucky were challenged, the State of Arkansas
successfully implemented a work requirement on Medicaid recipients
before a suit was brought against it in the same court as the Kentucky
case.18 The same judge heard both states’ cases, and on March 27, 2019,
Judge Boasberg struck down the validity of both states’ work
requirements.19 Judge Boasberg invalidated work requirements under
Medicaid beneficiaries as to how to comport with Arkansas’s program). Medicaid
beneficiaries also recently filed suit in New Hampshire. Michelle Hackman, Third
Lawsuit Filed Over Medicaid Work Requirements, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/third-lawsuit-filed-over-medicaid-work-requirements11553120783.
13. (Stewart I), 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018).
14. Id. at 243.
15. Id. at 271–72.
16. Letter from Paul Mango, Chief Principal Deputy Admin. & Chief of Staff, U.S.
Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Carol H.
Steckel, Comm’r, Dep’t for Medicaid Servs., Commonwealth of Ky. (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ky/ky-health-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB34-W4Z8]
(creating a community engagement requirement for beneficiaries between nineteen
and sixty-nine years old).
17. Id.
18. See Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019); Dylan Scott, 16,932
People Have Lost Medicaid Coverage Under Arkansas’s Work Requirements, VOX (Dec. 18,
2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/18/18146261/arkansasmedicaid-work-requirements-enrollment [https://perma.cc/R2WS-B7RV].
19. Stewart v. Azar (Stewart II), 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 156 (D.D.C. 2019) (Kentucky);
Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 175 (Arkansas). The day after the decisions, Arkansas
Governor, Asa Hutchinson, called for HHS to immediately appeal the decision, and
the Trump administration quickly followed suit on April 10th. Amy Goldstein, Trump
Administration Appeals Rulings That Blocked Medicaid Work Requirements, WASH. POST
(Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trumpadministration-appeals-rulings-blocking-medicaid-work-
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the same arbitrary and capricious standard in rejecting both states’
arguments that the financial solvency of the states’ individual programs
and the financial self-sufficiency of Medicaid recipients were
appropriate objectives of the Medicaid program.20 Further, the court
noted it was wary of the likely substantial disenrollment of beneficiaries
from the programs, and the HHS Secretary’s inadequate contemplation
of such an effect rendered the section 1115 waivers invalid.21 On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in October of
2019, during oral arguments, a panel of judges expressed similar
skepticism of the states’ justifications for their respective waivers.22 The
Appeals Court has yet to issue its decision, but the ultimate question of
work requirements may well reach the Supreme Court.
This Comment will analyze the validity of Medicaid work
requirements in the context of the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence and examine the broader validity of various states’ efforts
to impose requirements through section 1115 of the Social Security Act.
It will argue that requiring Medicaid enrollees to work to remain
covered via section 1115 waivers impermissibly discriminates based on
economic status and violates the intent and purpose of Medicaid.
These requirements impermissibly discriminate based on economic
status because policies affecting those experiencing poverty demand
heightened scrutiny, or at least a rational basis plus bite analysis, and do
not further a legitimate government objective, thus making them
requirements/2019/04/10/689024f6-5bb9-11e9-a00e-050dc7b82693_story.;
Amy
Goldstein, Arkansas Governor Seeks Appeal of Decision Voiding Medicaid Work Rules, WASH.
POST (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
arkansas-governor-seeks-appeal-of-decision-voiding-medicaid-work-rules/2019/03/
28/7d88461c-516f-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html?utm_term=.057c8ede7e54.
20. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 148, 154–55; Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 181. Judge
Boasberg noted his displeasure with repeated attempts to impose requirements,
most recently finding New Hampshire’s efforts to impose work requirements
invalid, writing, “we have all seen this movie before.” Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19773(JEB), 2019 WL 3414376, at *2 (D.D.C. July 29, 2019); see Amy Goldstein,
Federal Judge Strikes Down New Hampshire’s Medicaid Work Requirements, WASH. POST
(July 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/federal-judge-strikesdown-new-hampshires-medicaid-work-requirements/2019/07/29/a8e7fb6c-b23711e9-951e-de024209545d_story.
21. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 141–43; Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 175; Philbrick,
2019 WL 3414376, at *1.
22. Amy Goldstein, Appeals Panel Expresses Skepticism About Medicaid Work
Requirements, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/
appeals-panel-expresses-skepticism-about-medicaid-work-requirements/2019/10/
11/a8357c4e-eb8a-11e9-9c6d-436a0df4f31d_story. [https://perma.cc/T3ES-BLLE].
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unconstitutional. Even if such work requirements withstand a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge, promoting better health outcomes, saving the
state money, and encouraging self-sufficiency at the risk of disenrolling
innumerable, otherwise qualified people contravenes the intent and
purpose of Medicaid. Rather, the primary purpose of Medicaid is to
furnish medical care for indigent populations.
Part I examines the history and structure of the Medicaid program
and discusses the program’s intent and purpose by scrutinizing
legislative history and case law. This Part will also explore the history and
use of section 1115 waivers, and the current landscape surrounding
work requirements. Part II traces the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence, particularly the Court’s treatment of poverty as a
protected class. Part III argues that work requirements are invalid
because they constitute impermissible economic status discrimination
against those experiencing poverty, and, at minimum, would fail a
traditional “rational plus bite” review. In the alternative, even if the
Court were to reject the equal protection claim, section 1115 waivers
petitioning for work requirements violate the intent and purpose of
the Medicaid program and thus should be categorically denied.
This Comment concludes by affirming the pivotal role Medicaid
plays in bridging historic inequities in access to healthcare and the
devastating effect work requirements have on those living in poverty.
By considering the consequences of targeting the poor by implementing
work requirements, this Comment argues states have a responsibility to
ensure access to basic needs. And finally, as part of a broader recognition
of the vulnerability of those living in poverty, this Comment will urge the
Court to take a more protective view of economic status and fulfill the
promises inherent within the Constitution.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE MEDICAID PROGRAM
This Part will provide a background discussion of the history and
structure of the Medicaid program. It will explore previous efforts to
reform healthcare, the political context of the era, and the legislative
history regarding Medicaid. This analysis shows that human dignity was a
chief concern of the drafters and that the drafters never contemplated
work requirements as a component of eligibility. This Part continues with
a glance at where Medicaid stands today, an explanation of section 1115
waivers, and the current landscape of requested changes among the states.
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A. Legislative History of Medicaid
John F. Kennedy’s victory in the 1960 election marked a transformative
moment in American politics, as the Democratic platform eschewed the
laissez-faire economics of the 1950s and confronted the scourge of deep
poverty throughout America.23 Beginning with President Kennedy and
continuing with President Johnson, the executive branch embarked on
an ambitious national effort to mitigate economic inequality.24 These
initiatives endure in the collective American consciousness with names
such as the New Frontier, Great Society, and the War on Poverty.25
Integral to this effort was the passage of Medicare and Medicaid
through the Social Security Amendments of 1965 (Title IX).26 This was
the culmination of a bruising political battle, as broader comprehensive
health insurance programs had eluded Democratic presidents since the
Franklin Roosevelt administration.27 Earlier attempts faced widespread
opposition from interest groups like the American Medical Association
(AMA) and bills attempting to pass old-age health insurance failed in
every year from 1952 to 1965.28 After recognizing that the system in
place under the Kerr-Mills Act of 196029 inadequately covered needy
individuals, congressional action converged around two separate federalstate programs.30 The Johnson administration then helped push through
23. See Carl M. Brauer, Kennedy, Johnson, and the War on Poverty, 69 J. AM. HIST. 98,
99–101 (1982) (tracing the evolution of the Democratic Party’s embrace of antipoverty efforts as contrasted with Republicans’ celebration of free enterprise and the
“people’s capitalism”).
24. For a further discussion of the political moment and a collection of different
scholarly works, see BRODIE ET AL., POVERTY LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 75–77 (2014).
25. See id.
26. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 286, 288 (1965).
27. Julian E. Zelizer, How Medicare Was Made, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 15, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/medicare-made [https://perma.cc/ 4KU7PU84]; see also Wilbur J. Cohen & Robert M. Ball, Social Security Amendments of 1965: Summary and
Legislative History, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. BULL., Sept. 1965, at 3, 4, 9,
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v28n9/v28n9p3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC P8-Q98P].
28. Id. The words of Representative John Dingell during debate reflect the
intensity of the prolonged fight from entrenched opponents to Medicare and
Medicaid reform: “What we are doing today is adequate proof that high pressure
lobbying tactics and huge expenditures of funds cannot prevail against the will of the
American people where the need is as clear as that which cries for enactment of H.R.
6675.” 111 CONG. REC. 7442 (1965) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
29. Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 601, 74 Stat. 924, 925 (1960).
30. Only twenty-eight states adopted the Kerr-Mills Act of 1960 which provided
means-tested health insurance to elderly citizens. See Cohen & Ball, supra note 27, at 6.
Further, the guidelines for participation sharply limited eligibility leading to only one

712

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:703

the 1965 Amendments that created the Medicare and Medicaid programs
finally administering access to healthcare for individuals over the age of
sixty-five and certain indigent individuals regardless of age.31
The legislative history reflects an abiding concern over the
inadequacies of the current system and a desire to provide a basic safety
net for seniors and indigent individuals.32 Shepherded by President
Johnson, and buoyed by the results of the 1964 presidential election,
Congress ultimately settled on a bill that combined hospital insurance
paid for by Social Security taxes, a voluntary program covering physicians
paid for by general government revenue, and an expanded version of
Kerr-Mills that aimed to provide access to all needy individuals.33 The crux
of Medicaid—while not conceived as a mandatory federal program—
then and now is in its cooperative arrangement between the states and
the federal government, where the federal government sets minimum
requirements that each state must comply with to receive funding for
Medicaid.34 The drafters of the 1965 Amendments did not contemplate
work requirements for Medicaid; rather, the drafters’ principal concern
percent of potential beneficiaries actually receiving benefits. Zelizer, supra note 27. By
providing states with considerable leeway to create their own eligibility standards, KerrMills led to substantial disparities in the respective quality of the programs; it became
generally true that the poorer the state, the poorer the welfare system. Judith D. Moore
& David G. Smith, Legislating Medicaid: Considering Medicaid and Its Origins, 27 HEALTH
CARE FINANCING REV. 45, 4647 (2006). By 1965, three states accounted for 45% of the
total number of participants across the country. Id. at 47. The House Ways and Means
Committee concluded on the state of healthcare,
[a]lthough your committee believes that the Kerr-Mills legislation as a whole
has been very beneficial to the needy aged in our country, it has now
concluded that the overall national problem of adequate medical care . . . has
not been met to the extent desired . . . because of the failure of some States to
implement to the extent anticipated.
H.R. REP. NO. 89-213, at 20 (1965).
31. Zelizer, supra note 27.
32. In congressional debates over the 1965 legislation, California Representative
Roosevelt and Hawaii’s Senator Hiram Fong both emphasized the important role of
the legislation in fighting against poverty and preserving the dignity of all Americans.
111 CONG. REC. 7356 (1965) (statement of Rep. Roosevelt); 111 CONG. REC. 18512
(1965) (statement of Sen. Fong).
33. While participation in the Medicaid program was optional for states, the
program improved on Kerr-Mills by imposing a categorical obligation on states to
cover every public assistance category and evenly distribute benefits. Moore & Smith,
supra note 30, at 49.
34. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO
MEDICAID 3–4 (2016) [hereinafter POLICY BASICS], https://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-medicaid_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZS4-62RJ].

2019]

STATES' EFFORTS & WORK REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAID

713

was the expansion of a healthcare system that ensured adequate access
to medical services for many more Americans.35
B. Medicaid Today
Medicaid has undergone a number of changes since 1965. Congress
has expanded federal minimum requirements, provided new coverage
options for states, and allowed the program to help pay for healthcare
premiums.36 The program gives individual states the flexibility to
administer Medicaid so long as it is within the federal guidelines.37
States do not have to participate in Medicaid; but, to receive matching
federal funding, those that do participate “must comply with all
provisions of the federal Medicaid statute and its implementing
regulations, except insofar as individual requirements may be waived
by the federal government.”38 In its current form, Medicaid lists eightythree separate requirements that states must comport with to receive
matching federal funding.39 Specifically, state programs must cover
mandatory population groups dictated by the federal government,
individuals within these groups who meet the minimum financial
eligibility criteria, the state’s residents, U.S. citizens, and other eligible
immigrants.40 Further, the program must cover: children, parents and
certain relatives (who are not elderly, blind, or disabled), pregnant
women, the elderly, people with disabilities, and individuals under the
age of twenty-six who were in foster care until the age of eighteen.41 For
35. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 89TH CONG., REP. ON SOCIAL SECURITY
AMENDMENTS OF 1965 at 23 (Comm. Print 1965) (“In addition, the committee
recommends . . . a strengthening of . . . the Social Security Act so that adequate medical
aid may be provided for needy people.”); see also id. at 4 (“The committee’s bill would also
add a new title XIX to the Social Security Act which would provide a more effective KerrMills program for the aged and extend its provisions to additional needy persons.”).
36. POLICY BASICS, supra note 34, at 2–3.
37. Id. at 1.
38. J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D. Ariz. 1993) (citing Beltran v. Myers,
701 F.2d 91, 92 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1, 1396a (2012). Medicaid coverage requirements include
inpatient and outpatient services, physician, midwife, and nurse practitioner services,
laboratory and x-ray services, nursing and home health care, screening for children
under twenty-one, family planning, and rural health centers. See ROBIN RUDOWITZ ET
AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 10 THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT MEDICAID: SETTING THE FACTS
STRAIGHT 4 (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-10-Things-to-Knowabout-Medicaid-Setting-the-Facts-Straight [https://perma.cc/PV56-DJNU] (listing the
populations that Medicaid covers).
40. § 1396a(a)(10)(A), (b)(2)–(3).
41. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i).
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states that participate in Medicaid and fulfill the federal requirements,
the federal government will compensate all of the state’s medical
assistance expenses under the state’s plan.42 The reimbursement is
based on the state’s relative per capita income.43
Every state in the country has elected to participate in Medicaid,
making it the largest public health insurance program in the United
States.44 It covers roughly 20% of all Americans, mostly consisting of
children, people with disabilities, and seniors.45 Children account for
43% of all Medicaid beneficiaries while the elderly and people with
disabilities combined account for about 25%.46 The most prominent
change to the Medicaid program came in 2010 with the passage of the
Affordable Care Act47 (ACA), which broadened eligible recipients to
include all nonelderly citizens making within 133% of the Federal
Poverty Line (FPL).48 Although the Supreme Court declined to require
states to expand their programs to cover the newly eligible populations,
it allowed states the option to expand coverage on their own and noted
that Congress amended Medicaid to exist as part of a “comprehensive
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”49 As of
September 2019, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have
expanded their respective Medicaid programs.50

42. §§ 1396b(a)(1), 1396d(b).
43. §§ 1396b(a)(1), 1396d(b).
44. Medicaid, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/medicaid-home-page.aspx [https://perma.cc/K9TR-3DMQ].
45. RUDOWITZ ET AL., supra note 39.
46. Id.
47. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10201(i),
124 Stat. 119, 922 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(d)).
48. Medicaid, supra note 44.
49. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 (2012) (striking down
the ACA’s required Medicaid expansion as running afoul of Congress’ spending power
due to its coercive elements).
50. Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaidexpansion-decisions-interactive-map [https://perma.cc/EUW8-42VS].
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C. Section 1115 Waivers and the Intent and Purpose of the
Medicaid Program
There is an inherent tension embedded within the administration of
Medicaid given the dual role for states and the federal government.51
Still, as noted above, states must follow Medicaid regulations only so far
as required by the federal government.52 The Social Security Act’s
section 1115 waivers are a prominent release valve for this tension.53
Section 1115 waivers allow states to petition the Secretary of HHS to
approve an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project”54 that
waives compliance of some part of the Medicaid Act “to the extent and
for the period he finds necessary” to implement the project.55 Congress
conceived of section 1115 waivers as a way to “test out new ideas and
ways of dealing with the problems of public welfare recipients.”56
However, the Secretary of HHS has limited authority and can only
approve a waiver under finite guidance.57 Since gaining prominence in
51. Laura D. Hermer, Federal/State Tensions in Fulfilling Medicaid’s Purpose, 21
ANNALS HEALTH L. 615, 615–17, 636 (2012) (tracing opposition to Medicaid and
bemoaning the restrictions placed on beneficiaries as antithetical to the program).
Scholars have expressed unease at states’ abilities to tinker with Medicaid to placate
the political machinations within each state. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing
Medicaid, 14 UNIV. PA. J. CON. L. 431, 435 (2011) (arguing for the federalizing of
Medicaid due to the “political whims” of states infringing upon the purpose of the
program); Judith M. Rosenberg & David T. Zaring, Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section
1115 and State Health Care Reform, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 545, 546 (1995) (reflecting on
the enormity of the federal government’s effort to transform the healthcare system
and the states’ responses).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1, 1396a (2012).
53. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(ii) (2017) (noting that any “material changes” must be
approved by the Secretary of HHS); see Wood v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 836, 84849
(D. Ariz. 2013) (affirming the strictures of section 1115 waivers and the requirement
that the waivers must further the objectives of Medicaid); see also Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., About Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.
medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1115-demo/about-1115/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6QHF-2VT2].
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a).
55. Id.
56. S. REP. NO. 87-1589, at 19–20 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1961-1962.
57. To approve a waiver, the project must be an experiment, be limited to
provisions within the Medicaid Act, be likely to promote the objectives of Medicaid,
and be timebound as to the duration of the project. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID: SECTION 1115 WAIVERS: A PRIMER FOR STATE
LEGISLATORS 6 (2017) [hereinafter NCSL REPORT], http://www.ncsl.org/
Portals/1/Documents/Health/Medicaid_Waivers_State_31797.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MTT9-AN75].
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the early 1990s, section 1115 waivers have been used for a variety of
initiatives, for instance, to expand coverage to childless adults who were
not eligible for coverage.58 After passage of the ACA in 2010, aside from
the thirty-one states and the District of Columbia that expanded Medicaid,
seven states used waivers to expand their program and to attach provisions
like charging higher premiums.59 The waivers currently approved reflect
the broad array of uses for which states have applied section 1115.60
The waivers do not provide a blank check, as there is an expectation
that the HHS Secretary will only sparingly approve projects.61 Further,
waiver approvals are subject to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).62 The APA requires an “arbitrary, [and]
capricious”63 standard of review, where the agency must fully consider the
relevant statutory authority, provide a complete administrative record,
hold public comment forums on the prospective waiver, and include any
conditions attached to the approval of the waiver.64
Courts have invalidated previous waivers under the APA. As discussed
above, a court struck down Kentucky’s waiver request attempting to impose
work requirements on beneficiaries under the arbitrary and capricious
standard.65 Additionally, in Newton-Nations v. Betlach,66 the Ninth Circuit
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id.
60. For example, Arizona used a section 1115 waiver for a Targeted Investments
Program, which incentivized payments to providers for increasing physical and behavioral
health integration. California implemented Medi-Cal 2020, which allowed the State to
extend its safety net pool for five years and to better integrate care. Id. at 8.
61. See Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Rather, Congress intended
that the Secretary would ‘selectively approve[]’ state projects.” (citation omitted)).
62. JANE PERKINS, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, BACKGROUND TO MEDICAID AND
SECTION 1115 OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 4 (2017), https://9kqpw4dcaw91s37
kozm5jx17-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Medicaid
Section1115BG-04.03.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ffG-JXQV].
63. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (propounding that the agency must offer a satisfactory
explanation that includes a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
64. PERKINS, supra note 62, at 4–5.
65. See Stewart v. Azar (Stewart I), 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding
that the Secretary’s decision to approve the waiver was “arbitrary and capricious” in
not adequately taking into account the potential for substantial disenrollment in the
program); see also Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381–82 (9th Cir. 2011)
(overturning a section 1115 waiver from Arizona that required mandatory co-pays
because the court found it was simply a cost-saving measure and not the result of
intensive health policy research).
66. 660 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 2011).
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rejected a section 1115 waiver that attempted to increase mandatory
Medicaid co-payments because the record did not adequately reflect
consideration of the plan’s effects on beneficiaries and simply manifested
an attempt by the state to save money.67 Finally, the Act includes limitations
that categorically bar the Secretary from approving a state’s waiver.68
In the interpretation of Medicaid broadly, courts have held in a variety
of formulations that the program is a cooperative federal-state operation that
provides funds to participating states for medical care of needy individuals.69
There is a delicate balance in finding where waivers are an appropriate
exercise of a state’s discretion, as the Secretary must balance the objectives of
Medicaid with the state’s desire for flexibility. This has polarized scholars with
some lauding the flexibility waivers afford states and others bemoaning the
states’ abilities to circumvent the underlying purpose of the program.70
II. EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
Part II of this Comment will trace the Supreme Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence over the last one hundred years. Specifically,
this Part will discuss the Court’s “discrete and insular minorities”
framework, how the Court identifies and addresses fundamental
rights, the differing levels of scrutiny the Court applies to government
67. Id. at 381 (“Moreover, the administrative record reveals that the purpose of
Arizona’s waiver application was to save money.”). But see Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d
1090, 1109 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding work requirements within the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children because the requirements comported with the intent and
purpose of the welfare statute and did not reflect an illegitimate end of the state).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. For example, states cannot waive important provisions like
requiring timely access to medical services to all those eligible and requiring
reimbursement figures that comport with a rational rate-setting process. See Restrictions
on the Scope of Section 1115 Waivers in the Medicaid Program, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM
(July 23, 2013), https://healthlaw.org/resource/restrictions-on-the-scope-of-section1115-waivers-in-the-medicaid-program [https://perma.cc/SWU7-V7DM].
69. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (noting that Medicaid was
created to provide federal assistance to states that choose to reimburse medical costs
for indigent persons); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 20 (3d Cir. 1989)
(describing Medicaid’s primary purpose as helping the poor achieve access to health
care), aff’d, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
70. See Jonathan R. Bolton, The Case of The Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy
Critique of the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 94 (2003); Huberfeld, supra note 51, at 435 (arguing for the
federalization of Medicaid due to the “political whims” of states infringing upon the
purpose of the program); Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 51, at 546 (reflecting on the
enormity of the federal government’s effort to transform the healthcare system and
the states’ responses).
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actions, and how the Court’s treatment of poverty within the equal
protection analysis has evolved.
A. The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits
states from imposing laws that treat their citizens differently for reasons
that do not further a legitimate government purpose.71 The modern
conception that the Fourteenth Amendment protects minority rights
emerged from the famous “Footnote 4” of United States v. Carolene
Products Co,72 where the Court moved away from striking down
economic and business regulations (under threat of President Roosevelt’s
court-packing plan) towards the protection of vulnerable populations.73
Previously, the Court assiduously avoided proactive protection of
minorities, preferring to insert itself in progressive economic reform.74
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,75 the Court ushered in the
modern era of equal protection jurisprudence, where under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court sought to safeguard
fundamental rights and protect against “invidious” discrimination.76
Through substantive due process analysis, the Court has recognized
these fundamental rights include the right to marriage,77 the right to

71. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was incorporated to apply to the states in the midtwentieth century, states that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
73. See id. at 153 n.4 (“[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 742 (1985) (applying the concept of
“discrete and insular minorities” to contemporary times).
74. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 917–18 (1987)
(finding the Lochner era to be defined by “government neutrality” and broader
skepticism of government intervention).
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 717–18 (3d ed. 2009).
77. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (striking down a state
law that prohibited same-sex marriage).
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interstate travel,78 the right to parent one’s child,79 and the right to
marital privacy.80 The Court created this mechanism by reasoning that
these rights are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”81 or “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”82 When considering
whether a state’s action infringes upon a fundamental right, a court
will apply strict scrutiny and consider whether the action is applied
narrowly to fit a compelling government interest.83
The Court eventually moved away from expanding fundamental
rights and instead developed a “suspect class” framework that asks what
level of scrutiny applies to a particular government policy.84 Overtime,
the Court settled on an analysis that is guided by whether the group in
question has suffered historic discrimination, lacks political power, is
defined by a trait that is immutable or difficult to change, and whose
trait is relevant to a group’s ability to contribute to society.85 The Court
78. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 48–49 (1867) (overruling a statute
that taxed citizens upon leaving the Nevada border).
79. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (overruling a statute
mandating attendance at public school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401–03
(1923) (striking down a law restricting the teaching of foreign languages).
80. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (invalidating a state law
that forbade the use of contraceptives as violating the right to marital privacy); see also
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (plurality) (detailing
how protections provided in the Bill of Rights apply to any restraints on freedom).
81. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
82. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 506 (1977) (plurality)
(finding that a zoning ordinance violated substantive due process by intruding upon
the “sanctity of the family”).
83. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (holding that a statute
prohibiting interracial marriage constituted arbitrary and invidious discrimination);
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (finding that a poll tax
infringed upon the fundamental right to vote, stating, “[w]e have long been mindful
that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection
Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized
and carefully confined”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (remarking
that a sterilization law for criminals dealt with “one of the basic civil rights of man”);
see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 719 (“Under strict scrutiny, a law is upheld if it
is proven necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.”).
84. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (“The guarantee of equal
protection under the Fifth Amendment is not a source of substantive rights or liberties,
but rather a right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications
and other governmental activity[.]” (footnote omitted)).
85. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–45 (1985)
(applying the suspect class factors analysis to people with intellectual disabilities);
Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 742
(2014) (“If the Court answers ‘yes’ to some portion of these questions, then it will

720

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:703

recognized race, nationality, religion, and alienage as suspect classes,
and under this umbrella struck down legislation that did not meet
strict scrutiny.86 Gender is quasi-suspect, which requires intermediate,
though not strict scrutiny.87 Like fundamental rights, throughout the
1970s, the Court limited the expansion of finding protected classes by
forcing plaintiffs to show a discriminatory purpose behind a
government policy, thereby sharply limiting the Equal Protection
Clause’s applicability.88 Scholars now generally conclude that the
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is closed, as the Court is simply
unwilling to extend protections beyond the classes it has recognized.89

deem that group a suspect or quasi-suspect class and will apply more searching scrutiny
to laws discriminating against that group. These twin doctrines (suspect classification
analysis and heightened scrutiny) are supposed to identify and protect against laws
that enforce invidious discrimination.”).
86. Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection
Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. R. 1059, 1078 (2011); see also Pollvogt, supra note 85, at 744
(explaining that strict scrutiny requires discriminatory classifications to be narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest, placing the burden upon the
government to justify a discriminatory action).
87. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (imposing a less-stringent form of
scrutiny, whereby gender classifications “must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” (emphasis
added)). Note that only three years earlier, the Court suggested, in a plurality opinion,
that policies implicating gender should be treated with strict scrutiny. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“[C]lassifications based
upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are
inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”).
88. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (allowing courts to infer a
discriminatory purpose from disparate impact but holding that disparate impact alone
is insufficient to demonstrate a racial classification); see also Barnes & Chemerinsky,
supra note 86, at 1081 (suggesting that the Court has neutered itself because “the
combination of the tiers of scrutiny and the requirement for a discriminatory purpose
combine to immunize from judicial review countless government actions which create
great social inequalities”).
89. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756–57 (2011)
(asserting that although litigants have argued that new classifications such as age, disability,
and sexual orientation should receive a heightened form of scrutiny, “these attempts have
an increasingly antiquated air in federal constitutional litigation . . . . At least with respect
to federal equal protection jurisprudence, this canon has closed”). However, though states
have generally applied the same protections based on their own equal protection clauses,
there is still room for classes of individuals to achieve greater protection under state law, as
the U.S. Constitution is only a floor. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Equal Protection: Its
Diverse Guises and Effects, 66 ALB. L. REV. 599, 629 (2003). For instance, Tennessee
considers age a suspect class under its state constitution. See Nat’l Gas Distribs. v. Sevier
Cty. Util. Dist., 7 S.W.3d 41, 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
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For government action affecting non-protected classes or fundamental
rights, the Court generally applies a “rational basis review,” where the
government simply must show some rational justification for the
government action.90 The Court’s formulation follows that “if there is
any reasonably conceivable state of facts” that demonstrates “a rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose” then the action is constitutional.91 The result of
the Court’s current jurisprudence is that most government policies
survive an equal protection analysis.92
However toothless rational basis review might appear on paper, the
Court has still applied a modicum of scrutiny in several cases, utilizing
what has come to be known as rational basis review “with bite.”93 For
example, the Court has invalidated several government policies affecting
those with disabilities,94 gay people,95 hippies,96 and classifications that
are “wholly unrelated to the objective” of the government’s regulation.97
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,98 the city of Cleburne
rejected a permit application on zoning grounds for the construction
of a residential home for those who were mentally disabled.99 The
90. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)
(finding that any conceivable justification was sufficient to uphold the legislature’s
classification, as long as the classification had a rational purpose). But see James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 145 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that rational
basis review is “no scrutiny whatsoever”).
91. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
92. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 720 (“The rational basis test is enormously
deferential to the government and only rarely have laws been declared
unconstitutional for failing to meet this level of review.”).
93. See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law,
Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 630 (2008) (stating
that when the Court finds invidious discrimination it applies rational basis review “with
bite” by prohibiting the government action even though it does not implicate a
fundamental right or protected class).
94. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435, 465 (1985)
(denying heightened scrutiny for people with intellectual disabilities but striking down
a city program for its reliance on false stereotypes).
95. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (overturning a Colorado law
prohibiting the passage of legislation that protected the status of homosexuals).
96. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (striking down a
statute that reflected “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group”).
97. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (invalidating a state law that prohibited
access to contraceptives for unmarried persons, concluding that there was no rational basis
for the state’s differential treatment between the married and unmarried persons).
98. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
99. Id. at 446.
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Court reversed the city’s denial, but in doing so, refused to extend
quasi-suspect protection to those who are mentally impaired, as the
lower courts had suggested.100 However, the Court still struck down the
requirement for the permit using rational basis review because it found
that the permit requirement rested on “an irrational prejudice against
the mentally retarded.”101 In Romer v. Evans,102 the Court confronted an
approved amendment to Colorado’s state constitution that prohibited
the legislature from passing any protections for gay people.103 Colorado
argued that this amendment was a necessary protection for other
citizens’ religious views and the State’s interest in the conservation of
resources to fight other discrimination.104 The Court rejected this
reasoning and overturned the amendment, stating that the proposed
change was not “directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or
discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any
factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate
state interests.”105 Finally, in United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno,106 the Court considered an amendment to a government welfare
program that denied benefits to families who, while they met the income
requirements, consisted of people who were not directly related
(households containing more than one unrelated person were
barred).107 Applying a rational basis test, the Court found that this
limitation was improper because it barred hippies and hippie communes
from participating in the food stamp program, which simply reflected a
“bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” thus
not reflective of a “legitimate governmental interest.”108
These cases suggest that there is a mechanism by which the Court
can subvert its traditional equal protection analysis if it detects
particularly invidious discrimination by the state.109

100. Id.
101. Id. at 450.
102. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 635.
105. Id.
106. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
107. Id. at 531.
108. Id. at 534.
109. But see Yoshino, supra note 89, at 763 (“Yet even the Court’s rational basis with
bite protection will ground out at a certain point . . . . Pluralism anxiety has operated,
and will continue to operate, as a serious obstacle to the recognition of classificationspecific judicial protections . . . .”).
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B. Poverty as a Protected Class
The Court has treated poverty as a protected class, or at the very
least, has intimated that poverty implicates serious equal protection
considerations.110 In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,111 the Court
struck down the use of poll taxes.112 The majority stated, “[w]ealth, like
race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate
intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth
or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”113 The Court
expressed palpable unease tying voter qualifications to wealth, as it
found no plausible state interest in conditioning the right to vote on
money; this was unlike the ability to read and write where the Court
imputed some reasonable state interest.114
Shortly following the Court’s proactive stance in recognizing the
precariousness of economic status, the Court buttressed its ability to
strike down classifications within social and economic legislation in
Levy v. Louisiana.115 There, the Court invalidated a state law that
prevented children born out of wedlock from recovering in a wrongful
death lawsuit involving their birth mother.116 In writing for the
majority, Justice Douglas wrote, “[i]n applying the Equal Protection
Clause to social and economic legislation, we give great latitude to the
legislature in making classifications . . . . However that might be, we
have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights.”117
Finally, in McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners,118 another case
that implicated election law and wealth, the Court upheld a state
provision that denied absentee ballots to persons held before trial.119
110. See Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People from Equal
Constitutional Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023, 1044 (2012) (“In these examples, the
Supreme Court interpreted equal protection as requiring heightened judicial scrutiny
of regulations burdening poor people.”).
111. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
112. Id. at 670.
113. Id. at 668 (citation omitted).
114. See id. at 666 (“But the Lassiter case does not govern the result here, because,
unlike a poll tax, the ‘ability to read and write . . . has some relation to standards
designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot.’” (citation omitted)).
115. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
116. See id. at 71–72 (affirming that even though the State’s policy might have had
“history and tradition on its side,” the Court could still intervene if the policy reflected
“invidious discrimination”).
117. Id. at 71.
118. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
119. Id. at 810–11.
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The Court was satisfied by the legislature’s deliberate determination of
adding different groups over a period of time that were deemed eligible
for an absentee ballot.120 Further, the Court was assuaged because this was
not a distinction based on wealth and race.121 To wit, the Court went out
of its way to affirm the sensitivity of such classifications based on wealth
or race, writing, “a careful examination on our part is especially
warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, two
factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect
and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.”122 Where the Court
identifies invidious discrimination, an antenna goes up, and the Court will
favor intervention even where it might traditionally defer to the states.
With regard to criminal cases, the Court has taken an even more
protective stance towards those living in poverty. Specifically, in Griffin v.
Illinois,123 the Court struck down a statute denying indigent defendants
the right to appeal their convictions because the defendants could not
pay for their requisite administrative record.124 The Court pondered
the inequities inherent in the criminal justice system relating to wealth,
finding “our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no
invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of
persons.”125 In a series of subsequent decisions throughout the 1960s
and beyond, the Court proscribed substantial protections for indigent
criminal defendants.126 Discrimination based on wealth in the criminal

120. Id. at 811.
121. Id. at 807.
122. Id. (citation omitted).
123. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
124. Id. at 19. The Court required the defendants to obtain the administrative
record before filing their appeal. The Court rigorously staked out its claim, writing,
“[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has.” Id.
125. Id. at 17.
126. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983) (rejecting revocation
of probation for failure to pay fine due to the defendant’s destitution); Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308 (1968) (striking down a statute that required unsuccessful
criminal appellants to pay the cost of their trial transcript); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355, 357 (1963) (holding that a state’s denial of appellate counsel for an
indigent defendant drew an “unconstitutional line” between rich and poor
defendants); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (mandating the right to
counsel for indigent criminal defendants).
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context raised an unavoidable red flag that implicated serious equal
protection concerns.127
The Court abruptly ended its flirtation with protecting economic status
classifications outside the criminal context following the Warren Court.
In a series of cases in the 1970s, the Court backed away from intervening
where poverty was implicated, as the Court hinted at its tremendous
unease with substituting its own judgment for that of legislatures.128 Most
notably, the Court curtailed its judicial protection for those living in
poverty in Dandridge v. Williams.129 The Court upheld Maryland’s cap on
the total amount of monthly welfare payments, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), regardless of family size.130 Rather than
provide heightened scrutiny, the Court chose to apply rational basis
review for social and economic classifications and found that the state had
a legitimate interest in curtailing welfare payments and encouraging
employment.131 The majority stated, “it is a standard that is true to the
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no
power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise
economic or social policy.”132 The Court was satisfied by the State’s
seemingly threadbare justification of the need to manage its finite amount
of welfare resources.133 Dandridge is widely seen as foreclosing judicial
protection of economic status classifications; however, Justice Marshall’s
dissenting opinion left open the possibility of reopening the door.134
Nevertheless, in subsequent cases, the Court has abandoned its treatment

127. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23–24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To sanction such a ruthless
consequence, inevitably resulting from a money hurdle erected by a State would justify a
latter-day Anatole France to add one more item to his ironic comments on the ‘majestic
equality’ of the law . . . . The State is not free to produce such a squalid discrimination.”).
128. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“We do not sit as a superlegislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730 (1963) (“We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts
do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative
bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”).
129. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
130. Id. at 486.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 485–86.
133. Id. at 486.
134. Id. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court recognizes, as it must, that this
case involves ‘the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings,’ and that
there is therefore a ‘dramatically real factual difference’ between the instant case and
those decisions upon which the Court relies.”).
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of poverty as a suspect class or at least refrained from demanding
heightened scrutiny for laws that discriminated based on economic status.135
Ultimately, while economic status is not technically a protected class,
the Court’s jurisprudence suggests that classifications based on poverty
raise substantial equal protection concerns and require a fresh analysis.
As some scholars have suggested, while the Court has repeatedly held that
classifications based on poverty alone do not mandate strict scrutiny, the
Court has never definitively stated that poverty is categorically not a
suspect classification.136 Potential ways the Court might reconfigure its
approach towards protections for those living in poverty figure
prominently in the following section.137
III. ANALYSIS
Part III of this Comment will argue that work requirements
impermissibly discriminate based on economic status. This Part will
show that under the Court’s traditional “discrete and insular minority”
framework, poverty fits within the strictures the Court has laid out.
Even if not, this Comment will show that work requirements would still
fail under a “rational basis plus bite” review. Finally, this Part will argue
that even if the Court refuses to apply any heightened scrutiny to
programs affecting those in poverty, work requirements still violate the
intent and purpose of the Medicaid program.
A. Work Requirements Reflect Impermissible Economic Status Discrimination
Work requirements fail under a reinvigorated equal protection analysis.
Under a traditional “discrete and insular minorities” analysis, economic
135. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[P]overty, standing alone, is
not a suspect classification.”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (“[T]his Court
has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29
(1973) (“[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone
provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . . .”). But see James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137, 145 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (castigating the majority’s refusal to
overturn a state initiative requiring local voter approval for low-income housing as
applying “no scrutiny whatsoever”).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)–(B) (2012) (requiring participating states to
cover all members of covered population groups and not only subsets of a group
described within the Act); see also Nice, supra note 110, at 1041 (“There is a critical
distinction between the accurate statement that the Court has never held poverty to
be a suspect classification and the inaccurate statement that the Court has actually held
that poverty is not a suspect classification.”).
137. Infra Section III.A.
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status warrants a higher standard of scrutiny because those experiencing
poverty face extreme vulnerability, historical discrimination, political
powerlessness, and an inability to escape their economic circumstances.138
Under a heightened scrutiny review, or even rational basis plus teeth
analysis, work requirements would fail due to the discriminatory effects of
the program and the burdens placed on those living in poverty. Since
those burdened by the imposition of work requirements are invidiously
discriminated against for experiencing poverty, attempts to implement
similar programs should be struck down.
Historical precedent provides an opening for the Court to apply
heightened scrutiny to programs affecting those living in poverty.139
The Court has suggested on numerous occasions that classifications
based solely on poverty warrant heightened scrutiny.140 In Dandridge,
where the Court purportedly limited classifications based on poverty to
business-like rational basis review, the Court also stated that there is a
“dramatically real factual difference” between regulations affecting those
living in poverty and businesses, yet it never actually grappled with this
concern.141 A number of scholars in recent years have used widening
income inequality to call for renewed protections for those living in
poverty and have queried whether now is the time for the Court to
reappraise the possibility of poverty reaching the level of a suspect class.142
138. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
139. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668 (1966) (striking down
poll taxes and finding that “[v]oter qualifications have no relation to wealth”). Wealth
in a criminal context has always garnered considerable concern from the Court. See,
e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308 (1966) (finding that a distinction based on
punishment had no rational connection with a transcript cost and was thus
unconstitutional); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355, 357 (1963) (requiring appellate
counsel for an indigent defendant in an appeal of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963) (requiring counsel for indigent criminal defendants).
140. See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969)
(“[A] careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the
basis of wealth or race, two factors which would independently render a classification highly
suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.” (citation omitted)).
141. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
142. See Maurice R. Dyson, Rethinking Rodriguez After Citizens United: The Poor as a
Suspect Class in High-Poverty Schools, 24 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2016) (“[O]n
repeated occasions over the years, the Court has provided surprising dicta . . . that
supports the notion that under the right factual pleadings and evidence, poverty might
constitute a suspect class.”); Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 2, 97–
98 (2018) (arguing that the Court has never repudiated the idea of using the
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent states from interfering with citizens’ fundamental
rights and cautioning the Court against heading down this path); Goodwin Liu,
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Evaluating the “dramatically real factual difference” noted in
Dandridge143 between the regulation of business and regulations relating
to people in poverty, the “discrete and insular” minority analysis appears
to satisfy the Court’s framework on its face. First, those living in poverty
face extreme vulnerability as the oft-noted victims of predatory state
actors.144 Next, those living in poverty have faced persistent historical
discrimination preceding the Nation’s founding.145 Additionally, those
without wealth lack real political power as access to the political system
is largely confined to economic elites.146 Even further, poverty ensnares
those within its grasp, creating a de facto immutability of characteristic
as evidenced by entrenched social immobility.147 And finally, those
Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 268 (2008) (arguing that
the possibility of courts treating poverty with greater judicial scrutiny is dependent not
on increased litigation but on an evolution in popular norms regarding wealth in our
public culture); Nice, supra note 110, at 1031, 1033 (raising the glaring issue that poor
people are denied equal protection under the Constitution and also lack the financial
clout necessary to gain political protection); Danieli Evans Peterman, Socioeconomic
Status Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2018) (arguing that Congress should
proactively include poverty within anti-discrimination statutes). The most prominent
scholar to initially call for greater protections for those experiencing poverty within
the Fourteenth Amendment framework was Professor Frank Michelman. See Frank I.
Michelman, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 7, 8 (1969) (arguing that claims made under poverty protections are best
understood as material deprivations rather than unequal treatment).
143. 397 U.S. at 487.
144. See, e.g., STEVEN H. WOOLF ET AL., URBAN INST., HOW ARE INCOME AND WEALTH
LINKED TO HEALTH AND LONGEVITY? 1 (2015), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/49116/2000178-How-are-Income-and-Wealth-Linked-to-Healthand-Longevity.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AS2-ZYKC] (highlighting the predation often
visited upon those experiencing poverty); Matthew Shaer, How Cities Make Money by
Fining the Poor, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
01/08/magazine/cities-fine-poor-jail.html [http://perma.cc/T52S-DKCD].
145. See, e.g., NANCY ISENBERG, WHITE TRASH: THE 400-YEAR UNTOLD HISTORY OF
CLASS IN AMERICA at xv–xvi (2016) (sketching the endurance of class within the American
political framework and its applicability throughout American history); see also Alec
MacGillis, The Original Underclass, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/the-original-underclass/492731
[https://
perma.cc/JT9L-S3TH] (discussing the imposition of class divides in colonial America).
146. See, e.g., Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERS. ON POL. 564, 576 (2014) (delineating
models of political responsiveness and the overwhelming influence that elites and business
interests have over the American political system, finding “[w]hen a majority of citizens
disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose”).
147. See, e.g., PABLO A MITNIK & DAVID B. GRUSKY, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. & RUSSELL
SAGE FOUND., ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2015),
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living in poverty face persistent societal disapproval, as caricatures and
stereotypes run rampant throughout American society.148 Should the
Court reopen its equal protection jurisprudence, poverty presents an
ideal group to protect with some form of heightened scrutiny.149 Under
such scrutiny, work requirements would fail given the lack of a
compelling, narrowly tailored, state interest and the ultimate effect of
denying access to medical assistance.150
Analyzing the Court’s jurisprudence in a few instrumental cases
provides a particularly useful insight into how it might treat poverty, work
requirements, and heightened scrutiny. In Levy v. Louisiana,151 the Court
invalidated a state law that prevented children born out of wedlock from
recovering in a wrongful death lawsuit involving their birth mother.152
The Court found Louisiana’s policy disfavoring children born out of
wedlock, as justified by the State’s interest in preserving the traditional
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/07/fsm-irs-report_artfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZY3Z-X23V] (commenting that children born in low income
homes will likely end up as low income adults). Compare San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1973) (suggesting that poverty as a class is unfeasible
because its definition would be too broad under a traditional analysis), with Peterman,
supra note 142, at 1342 (arguing that socioeconomic status, or current financial
situation, is a sufficient measure because it is a simple question of defining whether a
person is “currently poor”).
148. See, e.g., Sandra K. Schneider, The Impact of Welfare Reform on Medicaid, in
WELFARE REFORM: A RACE TO THE BOTTOM? 197–98 (Sanford F. Schram & Samuel H.
Beer eds., 1999) (connecting welfare reform and open appeals to work ethic to states’
efforts to enshrine personal responsibility and access to healthcare); Thomas Ross, The
Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1500 (1991) (arguing
that there has been a long history of labeling the poor as morally distinct and weak); Anat
Shenker-Osorio, Why Americans All Believe They Are ‘Middle Class’, ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/why-americans-all-believe-theyare-middle-class/278240 [https://perma.cc/5BFY-ZU9J] (expanding upon Americans’
notions of self-worth and reluctance to be associated with negative connotations of class
by reasoning, for example, “[i]f homelessness is the salient exemplar [of poverty],
people are unlikely to say they’re ‘poor.’”).
149. See Nice, supra note 110, at 1050–51 (“Justice Stewart utterly failed to grapple
with how this ‘dramatically real factual difference’ might matter for the level of judicial
scrutiny, and instead simply declared that the majority found ‘no basis for applying a
different constitutional standard’ . . . Really? No basis in the reasoning of footnote four
of Carolene Products?” (footnotes omitted)).
150. See Pollvogt, supra note 85, at 744 (explaining strict scrutiny to require
discriminatory classification to be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest).
151. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
152. See id. at 71–72 (1968) (affirming that even though the State’s policy might
have “had history and tradition on its side,” the Court could still intervene if the policy
reflected “invidious discrimination”).
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family, invalid because it implicated the children’s basic rights and
reflected “invidious discrimination.”153 Further, in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections, the Court struck down a poll tax in applying a more
searching judicial inquiry and rejected the State’s rationale that it could
tie voting to wealth like requiring a fee for driving.154 The Court rejected
wealth as a precondition to voting, calling it a “capricious or irrelevant
factor” compared to the importance of voting.155 Here, as applied to work
requirements, encouraging employment and self-sufficiency might be a
rational extension of a state’s welfare program and an appropriate
justification under the most superficial rational basis review.156 But, within
the context of Medicaid, work requirements fail to meet any level of
heightened scrutiny because of their invidious targeting of a class of people
and the ultimate deprivation of a fundamental necessity—healthcare.157
Finally, work requirements have the potential to extend their
consequences far beyond their intended targets, suggesting that far
from being narrowly tailored, this state action is likely overbroad and
capricious.158 Before the lower federal court intervened to halt the
implementation of work requirements in Arkansas, a substantial
number of beneficiaries (approximately 18,000) lost access to their
benefits, in part due to the confusing nature of the program and the
attendant bureaucratic machinery created by the State.159 Critically, the
vast majority of Medicaid beneficiaries already work, go to school, care
153. Id. at 71.
154. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
155. Id.
156. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (utilizing
rational basis review to uphold any conceivable justification even if the justification was
not stated on the legislative record).
157. Contra Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970) (upholding, under
a rational basis standard, Maryland’s efforts to ration its welfare payments per family
without consideration of total family size). Healthcare, like voting and familial status,
implicates an area of traditional concern for the Court and is not simply an allotment
of money based on a state budget.
158. RACHEL GARFIELD ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IMPLICATIONS OF A MEDICAID
WORK REQUIREMENT: NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF POTENTIAL COVERAGE LOSSES 1 (2018),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/implications-of-a-medicaid-workrequirement-national-estimates-of-potential-coverage-losses
[https://perma.cc/C54W-U8AB] (finding that because most Medicaid beneficiaries
already work, most “disenrollment would be among individuals who would remain
eligible but lose coverage due to new administrative burdens or red tape versus those
who would lose eligibility due to not meeting new work requirements”).
159. Foreclosing upon access to healthcare is a material deprivation with the possibility
of devastating long-term effects. See Goldstein, Job-Scarce Town Struggles, supra note 12.
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for a dependent relative, or are disabled.160 With potentially boundless
scope, requiring hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries who already work
to submit to arduous reporting requirements and the inevitable confusion
that follows, reflects a callous indifference to those experiencing poverty.161
Even if states were to refine the mechanisms by which beneficiaries could
comply with work requirements, the effect would still create a material
deprivation. Denying access to a previously conferred public benefit—
access to basic healthcare no less—with the potential to deprive tens of
thousands, is far from narrowly tailored or reflective of a compelling state
interest.162 It is effectively capricious discrimination, a state action the Court
strives to stamp out, particularly given the importance of access to healthcare.
B. “Rational Basis Plus Bite” as Applied to Work Requirements
If the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is truly closed, as
suggested by some,163 there is still an opening for the Court to grapple
with the “dramatically real factual” distinction between regulations
affecting businesses and classifications based on social or economic
status.164 The Court can still apply a “rational basis plus bite” review of
state action affecting those living in poverty and subject the policies to
a more searching judicial inquiry.165

160. See RACHEL GARFIELD ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., UNDERSTANDING THE
INTERSECTION OF MEDICAID AND WORK: WHAT DOES THE DATA SAY? 2 (2019), http://files.
kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Understanding-the-Intersection-of-Medicaid-andWork-What-Does-the-Data-Say [https://perma.cc/PLG3-Z66Q] (finding that nearly
eight in ten nonelderly beneficiaries live in working families, and a majority work
themselves); see also Lola Fadulu, Why States Want Certain Americans to Work for Medicaid,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/
04/medicaid-work-requirements-seema-verma-cms/587026 [https://perma.cc/7TN9XQ68] (positing a racial undertone to various states’ efforts to impose work
requirements for Medicaid).
161. See Fadulu, supra note 160 (discussing people losing Medicaid coverage due to
an inability to access or navigate the website).
162. Under Professor Michelman’s equal protection deprivation framework, a state
limiting access to healthcare and thus preventing the ability to fulfill basic needs,
would fail judicial scrutiny. See Michelman, supra note 142, at 58.
163. See Yoshino, supra note 89, at 757–59 (stipulating that the canon of heightened
scrutiny for new recognized classes is closed, but that the Court’s strengthening of
rational basis review could open the door to stronger protections).
164. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
165. For the discussion of what constitutes rational basis plus bite see infra Section III.C.
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Rational basis plus bite would compel the striking down of Medicaid
work requirements.166 The question becomes whether the Medicaid work
requirements are rational/reasonable and whether they reflect “invidious
discrimination” towards those living in poverty.167 Like the Court’s
reasoning in City of Cleburne, Romer, and Moreno, where the Court did not
apply heightened scrutiny but still found that the respective state action
invidiously targeted specific groups, under a “rational plus bite”
review,168 work requirements likely also fail given that this state action
deliberately, or “invidiously,” targets poor people and deprives them of
access to healthcare.169 Even though the rational basis review is highly
deferential to the state, in each of the above cases, the Court rejected each
state’s reasoning because it viewed the state action as a pretext to target a
class of people.170 Given that the justifications for imposing work
requirements on Medicaid beneficiaries are not rationally related to their
purported interest, and the effect these requirements will have in
disenrolling beneficiaries from Medicaid programs, work requirements
fail under enhanced rational basis review.171 The precipitous drop in the
Medicaid insurance program enrollment is a prima facie case for
irrationality as the state action disproportionately impacts those living in
poverty and would create an adverse effect on health outcomes across

166. See Nice, supra note 110, at 1053 (“If the courts nonetheless continue to assert
that heightened scrutiny is not warranted, my second suggestion is for the courts to
conduct an actual, factual, practical, and contextual review of the purported relation
between the government’s means and its ends to determine whether this linkage is in
fact rational or reasonable.”). But see Pollvogt, supra note 85, at 739 (suggesting suspect
classifications are too rigid and as such the Court should embrace their rational plus
bite review so that it is forced to evaluate concrete evidence as to why an act of
discrimination can be justified); Yoshino, supra note 89, at 761 (“Yet the importance
of this rational basis with bite standard should not be exaggerated. Rational basis with
bite review is not equivalent to formal heightened scrutiny.”).
167. See Nice, supra note 110, at 1054 (pointing out where the Court has stepped in
and identified invidious discrimination even without applying heightened scrutiny).
168. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623, 632–33 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973).
169. See Dyson, supra note 142, at 6–7 (arguing for a “poverty-plus” approach to
effectively challenge not only facially discriminatory practices, but also “indirect
discriminatory practices” faced by those in poverty).
170. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (proclaiming a “status-based” classification
regarding gay people antithetical to the protections of the 14th Amendment).
171. See GARFIELD ET AL., supra note 160, at 1.
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the state.172 The consequences of such a state policy have the potential
to extend far beyond the intended targets and as such reflects “invidious
discrimination.”173 Recall the vast majority of Medicaid beneficiaries
already work, go to school, care for a dependent relative, or are
disabled.174 Further, work requirements would upend the stated aim of
the Medicaid program—to furnish access to healthcare—suggesting the
targeting of those experiencing poverty.175 As the Court has suggested in
its jurisprudence, state interests in encouraging self-sufficiency or
preserving government coffers may be outweighed by the ultimate effect
of the state action. Rather than be tailored to a legitimate state goal,
work requirements are effectively a status-based, targeted classification
that perniciously impact all people living in poverty and thus must fail
even under a rational basis review.
The implications of heightened scrutiny as applied to those living in
poverty are far-reaching and would not only raise immediate questions
about the applicability of work requirements for Medicaid eligibility but
also for welfare benefits generally.176 If the Court is willing to extend
judicial protections for vulnerable populations based on economic status,
the rationalization for work requirements for other programs would likely
fall apart given the absence of a legitimate state interest in denying
access to a minimum standard of living.177 This would effectively ensure
that each person has some baseline protection from want and would
reorient our understanding of equality under the Constitution.178
172. See id. at 10 (note the substantial drop in Arkansas alone); Medicaid Briefs: Who Is Harmed
By Work Requirements?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/medicaidbriefs-who-is-harmed-by-work-requirements [https://perma.cc/2JCL-9Q59] (last updated
Mar. 14, 2019) (collection of research reflecting the pervasive harm work requirements will
inevitably cause to different vulnerable populations).
173. GARFIELD ET AL., supra note 158 (warning of the far-reaching consequences of
implementing work requirements).
174. See GARFIELD ET AL., supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting over 63%
work, 74% of those non-working are in school or a caretaker, and 51% of those not
working have a functional limitation).
175. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 20 (3d Cir. 1989), aff’d, 499
U.S. 83 (1991).
176. Huberfeld, supra note 8, at 790–91.
177. See Michelman, supra note 142, at 58 (proposing that equal protection claims
should be viewed under a material deprivation, or bare minimum framework, where the
Court strives to ensure that every citizen has an adequate ability to secure their welfare).
178. See Ganesh Sitaraman, Our Constitution Wasn’t Built for This, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY
REV. (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/16/opinion/sunday/
constitution-economy.html [https://perma.cc/AS3S-BS49] (arguing that the
Founders failed to account for the possibility of a severe increase in economic
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C. Work Requirements Violate the Intent and Purpose of Medicaid
If work requirements withstand an equal protection challenge, they
should still fail under the traditional section 1115 review as violative of
the intent and purpose of the Medicaid program. Since its inception in
1965, Medicaid has served as a critical lifeline for low-income individuals in
providing access to long-term care.179 In evaluating the appropriateness of
states’ section 1115 waivers work requirements, the central inquiry is
whether work requirements comport with the intent and purpose of
Medicaid.180 According to CMS, work requirements align with the
Medicaid Act because work and community engagement are “anchored
in historic CMS principles that emphasize work to promote health and
well-being.”181 Specifically, CMS argues that work requirements and
volunteering will spur self-sufficiency and employment thereby leading to
positive health outcomes in the long run.182 However, this tendentious
reasoning obfuscates the intent and purpose of Medicaid, as the
program’s primary purpose is to provide access to healthcare.183 Even
before the drafting of the original legislation, lawmakers recognized a need
to help states care for increasingly cost-heavy, care-reliant populations.184 In
reality, work requirements are simply a cost-saving measure for states with
the ultimate effect of disenrolling recipients due to burdensome monthly
requirements and few exceptions for current beneficiaries.185
inequality and urging a refocusing of the Constitution to better confront the oversight
of the founders’ documents).
179. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHY DOES THE MEDICAID DEBATE MATTER? NATIONAL
DATA AND VOICES OF PEOPLE WITH MEDICAID HIGHLIGHT MEDICAID’S ROLE 1 (2017),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-Why-Does-the-Medicaid-Debate-Matter
[https://perma.cc/9KP8-PBJ5].
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (2012); see also Huberfeld, supra note 8 (arguing that
work requirements are inconsistent with the Medicaid Act because the Act has never
emphasized work).
181. See State Medicaid Directors Letter, supra note 6 (suggesting that work
requirements will improve self-sufficiency by incentivizing work and therefore leading
to improved health outcomes over time). This shift in 2018 represents a profound
change in administrative priorities, as only a year prior CMS rejected Arizona’s request
to impose work requirements for Medicaid. See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting
Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to
Thomas Betlach, Dir., Az. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. (Sept. 30, 2016) (explicitly
disallowing work requirements for Medicaid, finding that the requirements “do not
support the objectives of the [Medicaid] program” and “could undermine access to care”).
182. State Medicaid Directors Letter, supra note 6.
183. Zelizer, supra note 27.
184. Id.
185. See Katch et al., supra note 7.
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In arguments before the district court regarding the State of Kentucky’s
request to impose work requirements, the HHS Secretary suggested that
a work mandate satisfies the purpose of Medicaid because the
requirements promote “greater independence,” and “reduc[e] reliance
on public assistance” by serving as a mechanism for providing
rehabilitation services and encouraging self-sufficiency.186 However, the
district court noted this is insufficient, “[t]he text, however, quite clearly
limits its objectives to helping States furnish rehabilitation and other
services that might promote self-care and independence. It does not follow
that limiting access to medical assistance would further the same end.”187
Work requirements impose immediate and unavoidable roadblocks to
continued participation in the program, affecting those who are most
vulnerable and effectively deny access to medical assistance.188
Additionally, judicial interpretations of the purpose of the Medicaid
program have repeatedly affirmed the primary objective of Medicaid as
furnishing access to health care, not promoting independence.189 In
various contexts, courts have upheld the idea of Medicaid to be a
cooperative program under which the federal government provides
funding and baseline requirements to have states provide medical services

186. See Stewart v. Azar (Stewart I), 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 271 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The
Secretary primarily cites Section 1396–1 in defense of that purpose, which
appropriates money so that states can ‘furnish . . . rehabilitation and other services to
help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or selfcare.’”); see also Stewart v. Azar (Stewart II), 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 146 (D.D.C. 2019)
(reaffirming that “self-sufficiency” is not an objective of the Medicaid program and
that it is irrelevant that the State only applies the requirements to the expansion
population). The district court, in its most recent decision regarding the validity of
work requirements, expressed its profound frustration at the HHS Secretary’s
repeated failure to consider the primary objective of Medicaid—furnishing medical
assistance. See id. at 155–56 (“Rather than follow that direction, the Secretary doubled
down on his consideration of other aims of the Medicaid Act . . . the Court has some
question about HHS’s ability to cure the defects in the approval.”).
187. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 271.
188. See Katch et al., supra note 7; ROBIN RUDOWITZ ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
FEBRUARY STATE DATA FOR MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENTS IN ARKANSAS (2019),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/State-Data-for-Medicaid-Work-Requirements-inArkansas [https://perma.cc/HZ9P-AGCQ] (noting that over 18,000 people lost
coverage due to the work and reporting requirements).
189. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 20 (3d Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he primary purpose of [M]edicaid is to achieve the praiseworthy social objective of
granting health care coverage to those who cannot afford it.”), aff’d, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
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to eligible individuals.190 Congress never contemplated encouraging selfsufficiency through mandated employment or volunteering by
conditioning federal funding to Medicaid work requirements.191 Similar to
the Ninth Circuit in Newton-Nations v. Betlach, where the court found that
Arizona’s mandatory increased co-pays did not have a research or
demonstration value (when viewed in the context of the Medicaid
program) and were simply a cost-saving mechanism,192 work requirements
reflect a cost-saving motivation that fails to provide a compelling
demonstration or research value to the state.193
A plain reading of the statute also reflects Medicaid’s primary purpose
to furnish medical assistance. The statute creating the program reads:
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under
the conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on
behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind,
or . . . disabled individuals, whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2)
rehabilitation and other services to help such families and
individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-care,
there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a
sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this [subchapter].194

Nothing within the legislative history, text of the statute, or judicial
interpretations of the Medicaid program reflects a desire or opening
for work requirements.195 Dignity and access to basic healthcare were the
primary motivations of the legislation.196 Further, there is a lack of
definitive evidence that work requirements are effective at increasing

190. See id. (describing the goal of reimbursing hospitals for caring for Medicaideligible patients); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n.1 (1985) (noting
Congress designed Medicaid to “subsidize[]” states in “funding . . . medical services
for the needy”); Ohio Dep’t of Medicaid v. Price, 864 F.3d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2017);
Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2017).
191. See Cohen & Ball, supra note 27, at 3–4 (discussing the goals of Medicaid
through the legislative process); supra note 32 and accompanying text (Congressional
Record and reports).
192. Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381 (9th Cir. 2011).
193. See id. (“The administrative record contains no finding from the Secretary that
Arizona’s demonstration project will actually demonstrate something different than
the last 35-years’ worth of health policy research.”).
194. Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2012)).
195. Cohen & Ball, supra note 27; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
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rates of employment over the long term, jeopardizing the central
justification of states like Kentucky in proposing these requirements.197
An illustrative point of comparison of congressional intent regarding
work requirements and benefits exists between Welfare Reform of the
1990s and Medicaid.198 In paradigm-shifting legislation reforming access
to welfare benefits in 1996, Congress dramatically altered access to
government welfare by writing “personal responsibility” into the title of the
reform act.199 The subsequent changes to welfare created stringent work
requirements (or participation in job training programs) that explicitly tied
the receipt of benefits to work.200 Congress cloaked the reforms in moral
justifications of preserving the sanctity of the family by imposing harsh
requirements.201 Welfare reform largely reflected a cultural shift, beginning
in the 1980s with the ascendance of the Reagan administration, that vilified
those purportedly taking advantage of government benefits and who were
ostensibly defrauding the system en masse.202 In contrast to welfare reform,

197. See Alvin Chang & Tara Golshan, The Republicans Push for Welfare “Work
Requirements,” Cartoonsplained, VOX (July 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/
2018/7/26/17465068/work-requirements-medicaid-snap-republican-cartoon
[https://perma.cc/R2H2-SWFD] (commenting that work requirements encouraged
people to work in the short term, but the effect of the work requirement diminished
a few years later).
198. See Laura D. Hermer, What to Expect When You’re Expecting . . . TANF-Style
Medicaid Waivers, 27 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37, 55–60 (2018) (evaluating the potential
acceptance of Medicaid work requirements, in the same vein as SNAP and TANF
justifications, and explaining the potential for negative consequences given that the
majority of Medicaid recipients already work).
199. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
200. Two programs, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),
commonly known as Food Stamps or EBT, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), imposed strict eligibility requirements largely centered around work.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Pub. L. No. 97-98, § 1333, 95 Stat. 1291
(1981) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2029 (2012)); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2129 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607).
201. See supra note 200; see also Claudia Schlosberg & Joel D. Ferber, Access to
Medicaid Since the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 31
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 528, 528–29 (1998) (detailing how welfare reform laid the
foundation for restrictions in access to Medicaid).
202. The impetus for welfare reform was catalyzed by harsh rhetoric surrounding
recipients of government benefits, culminating most notably with the term, “Welfare
Queen.” See Rachel Black & Aleta Sprague, The Rise and Reign of the Welfare Queen, NEW
AM. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-135/rise-andreign-welfare-queen (highlighting how continued welfare reform of the last decade
has clung to the tenet of equating poverty and criminality); see also PETER B. EDELMAN,
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Congress has only expanded eligible populations for Medicaid.203 With
the passage of the ACA, Medicaid expansion was understood to be part of
a systemic shift towards a national healthcare model, as the program is one
mechanism for needy individuals to receive access to care.204 Therefore, the
implementation of work requirements directly contradicts the intent of
Congress by thwarting an expressed goal of the legislature.
Work requirements, as currently structured, present implacable barriers
to retaining eligibility within the Medicaid program.205 As noted twice by
the District Court in Stewart v. Azar, the approval of Kentucky’s (and later
Arkansas’s) section 1115 waiver was “arbitrary and capricious” for failing to
account for the upwards of 95,000 Kentucky residents who were liable to be
disenrolled from the Medicaid program due to the imposition of work
requirements.206 Courts retain the ability to strike down section 1115

NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN AMERICA 92 (2017)
(understanding welfare reform as a broader effort to criminalize poverty and its
effects); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN
POOR 162 (1996) (demonstrating public support declines for welfare reform when
opposition to government programs exploits stereotypes about its primary beneficiaries);
Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 1 (2016) (underscoring the stereotypes of dependency underlying requirements for
government benefits); Ross, supra note 148, at 1500 (arguing that there has been a long
history of labeling the poor as morally distinct and weak).
203. See RUDOWITZ ET AL., supra note 39, at 3 (tracing Medicaid eligibility expansions
to children, pregnant women, and people with disabilities as well as the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) which helped cover children from low-income
families and enroll them in both CHIP and Medicaid).
204. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 (2012) (“The
Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree. The
original program was designed to cover medical services for four particular categories of
the needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent
children . . . . It is no longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an
element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”).
205. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Care in the United States and the Affordable Care
Act, 43 HUM. RTS. 6, 8 (2018) (noting that most Medicaid adults are working, disabled,
in school, or taking care of family and that “[a] recent study found that 46 percent of
all beneficiaries, and one-quarter of beneficiaries who worked 1,000 hours a year,
would fail to meet the 80-hour requirement at least one month a year”); see also Katch
et al., supra note 7; RUDOWITZ ET AL., supra note 188, at 1 (finding that since Arkansas’
work requirements have been implemented 18,000 residents have been disenrolled
from Medicaid in 2018).
206. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 140 (D.D.C. 2019); Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d
237, 265 (D.D.C. 2018) (“At bottom, the record shows that 95,000 people would lose
Medicaid coverage, and yet the Secretary paid no attention to that deprivation. Nor
did he address how Kentucky HEALTH would otherwise help ‘furnish . . . medical
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waivers should they run afoul of the objectives of the program and harm
those the programs were designed to protect.207 The primary objective of
Medicaid is to furnish access to medical assistance; as such, work
requirements directly contravene the stated objective of the healthcare
program by preventing those most in need of medical assistance of keeping
it.208 Not only are the states’ various efforts to impose barriers to Medicaid
arbitrary and capricious for failing to consider the disenrollment effect on
recipients as discussed by the District Court for the District of Columbia,
but they are also fundamentally flawed for not furthering an objective of
Medicaid. Thus, given that work requirements violate the intent and purpose
of Medicaid, the requirements should be found presumptively invalid.
CONCLUSION
At the signing ceremony for the Social Security Amendments of 1965
President Johnson stated,
Few can see past the speeches and the political battles to the doctor over
there that is tending the infirm, and to the hospital that is receiving
those in anguish, or feel in their heart painful wrath at the injustice
which denies the miracle of healing to the old and to the poor.209

Regrettably, states across the country are attempting to curtail access to
“the miracle of healing” with the potential implementation of work
requirements. These work requirements subvert congressional intent and
offend the guarantees implicit within the Constitution. By imposing work
requirements on Medicaid beneficiaries through section 1115 waivers,
states impermissibly discriminate based on economic status and violate the
intent and purpose of the Medicaid program. These requirements reflect
assistance.’ . . . By doing so, he ‘failed to consider adequately’ a salient purpose of
Medicaid and, thus, an important aspect of the problem.”).
207. Nazareth Hosp. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 747 F.3d 172,
181 (3d Cir. 2014) (“In fact, a Section 1115 waiver project can be vacated if a court
finds that the Secretary could not have rationally found the program likely to advance
the objectives of Medicaid.” (citing Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381 (9th
Cir. 2011)); see also Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1070 (9th Cir. 1994). It is equally
important to distinguish between Welfare and Medicaid here when contemplating the
intent and purpose of each respective program. Courts have upheld section 1115
waivers in the welfare context because the legislature deliberately considered tying
work to benefits, thus the tethering was within the intent and purpose of the statute.
See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973).
208. See RUDOWITZ ET AL., supra note 39, at 2–3 (emphasizing the devastating effects
work requirements would have on Medicaid beneficiaries due to their inability to meet
the program’s new mandate).
209. President Johnson, supra note 1.
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impermissible economic status discrimination because policies affecting
impoverished communities deserve heightened scrutiny, or at least a
rational basis plus bite analysis, and do not further a legitimate government
objective, making them unconstitutional. Even if work requirements
survive a constitutional assault, promoting better health outcomes and
encouraging self-sufficiency at the risk of disenrolling innumerable,
otherwise qualified people contravenes the intent and purpose of
Medicaid, which is to furnish medical care for indigent populations.
Work requirements reflect impermissible economic status
discrimination. Programs affecting those living in poverty deserve
heightened scrutiny under a traditional “discrete and insular minorities”
analysis, as these populations face extreme vulnerability, historical
discrimination, political powerlessness, and largely an inability to
escape their economic circumstances. Under heightened scrutiny, work
requirements fail because they unduly target those living in poverty and
are not narrowly tailored and do not promote a compelling government
interest. Moreover, even if equal protection jurisprudence is closed,
state action relating to those in poverty would still fail under a rational
plus bite analysis. Work requirements target poor people and do not
rationally further a state interest, effectively mirroring the invidious
and capricious discrimination, which the Court has vigilantly struck
down in the past, even without applying heightened scrutiny.
Notwithstanding judicial interpretations of whether incentivizing work
comports with the objectives of the Medicaid program, the clear purpose
of the cooperative federalism structure of the Medicaid program is to
“furnish medical assistance,” not to promote self-sufficiency or positive
health outcomes. Cost-saving justifications alone under section 1115
waivers are invalid and, should be categorically denied. Further, unlike
welfare reform, Congress never contemplated tying work requirements to
the receipt of Medicaid. Therefore, efforts to use section 1115 waivers to
impose such requirements are invalid for their failure to rationally further
an objective of the Medicaid program.
If the Preamble is our constitutional lodestar, under which we are to
truly create a “more perfect union” that “promote[s] the general
welfare,”210 then the Constitution ought to enshrine a fundamental

210. U.S. CONST. pmbl. For a discussion of the Preamble’s effect across the globe,
see Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 714,
719–20 (2010) (analyzing the meaning of the Preamble as understood by the
Founders, one of whom, James Monroe, saw the Preamble as the “Key of the
Constitution”); Milton Handler, Brian Leiter & Carole E. Handler, A Reconsideration of
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principle of equality and guarantee freedom from material deprivation.
This equality should permeate our constitutional jurisprudence and
provide protections to those who are trapped by the obstinance of
economic circumstance. Poverty should not be an impenetrable trap.
Access to healthcare and welfare benefits ought not to be restricted
through the imposition of work requirements. We need not all be
required to “work 9 to 5.”

the Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 117, 125–27 (1990) (arguing that while preambles do not create rights, they
should be used to interpret specific provisions within the Constitution). But see
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (“Although [the] Preamble indicates
the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution,
it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the
Government of the United States . . . .”).

